Not So Simple: Difficult Distinctions in Integralism

Julian! So much excitement here! It's one thing after another! I've always loved the energy you bring everywhere you go.

I basically agree with what you've said here, and there are some really important points. One is what you have called the “the faux nondual position” elswhere and which you touch on in 3. They basically take upper-left revelations and meditation instructions and try to apply them to all four quadrants–an example of the basic lack of hierarchy, integralism, and directionality we see in the new age.

With regard to faith, I think you're right that we can't say that faith (or trust) is transrational in and of itself, but we can say that it's an important ingredient in a transrational holon, an important building block for transrational consciousness.

Best,

David

excellent opening salvo, as always, Julian. i'll watch this thread and see how the discussion develops.

but since you end up with only 9 points, allow me to add one to make it a perfect 10. this point is also a critique of integrally-informed people.

10) avoidance of rational “food fights” (i.e. Sam Harris' conversational intolerance, Hirsi Ali's the right to offend, etc.) not framed in integral lingo, thus leading to a walled-garden of “integral” discussions. hence, the perceived cultishness of integral movement. not to mention the enormous amount of “faith” put on the transrational by people have no experience of it aside from descriptions given by Wilber and other mystics.

case in point: i've noticed that a number of integrally-aware people easily dismiss the efforts of the New Atheists. saying that the New Atheists are not doing anything new when it comes to philosophical arguments. that the New Atheists are mean to “blue.” and yet, integral is mean to “green” right? (i.e. Boomeritis). i see a bias there. conversational intolerance should span the color spectrum, when appropriate and given the chance.

i've recently riffed on this topic. see Why Sam Harris and B. Alan Wallace Should Talk

my two cents.

~C

In general agreement with the above… but for a point by point:

1: Yes there are worlds of difference between simply being aware that people possess different beliefs/worldviews/ideologies/etc. and being able to deeply inhabit multiple different experiential universes and make meaningful (not drastically distorted) cross comparisons between them.  It is still one further step to be able to skillfully apply the right perspective for the right action at the right time in an effective way that takes into account the other perspectives presently available.

2: Agree Turquoise does not necessarily = 'well' nor Red necessarily = 'pathological.'

3: Really Agree.  While Turquoise can intuit unification and even provide some grand maps… it is still embedded in the process of mapping/meaning making as a defense against the what-is, even if it might be fully aware of that fact.  If thoughts are most of your mental life… you are likely not at Unitive let alone Non-Dual even if your maps or intuitions predict Non-Duality is in fact so… or not so… or not so much not so as so beyond so and not so… etc.

4: 2 + 2 = 4 except in the land of 3's where it is 11.  Bad logical arguments are still bad logical arguments even if you are aware of Gödel.  Quantum uncertainty sucks for manufacturing automobiles.  Just because materialism or reductionism taken to the extreme can sometimes be 'bad' does not mean we should jettison the methodology anymore than we should get rid of our toasters because they make terrible bath toys.

5: Again agree, simply memorizing 1-p x 1-p x 1-p while possibly serving to expand cognitive concepts is a castle in the air unless you are familiarized with the practice of checking in with actual phenomenological experience.  Knowing what Zone # the discipline of Structuralism fits into is not as important as the knowledge that the world appearing to you is filtered through one of those structures at this very moment.

6: Just for the heck of it I propose a completely arbitrary new rule that people can only use the abbreviation IMP if they have actually read Kant and can articulate what the differences are between: being able to cause whatever objects one wishes to have appear in the world and behave as one wishes (The Secret); recognizing that the only 'objects' that can be 'known' are those that conform to the structural architecture of the perceiving mind in question (roughly Kant's insight); and every object out there appears as just what it is, can clearly be seen by anyone, and these objects are fully real and objective (naive realism). The new Integral Shibboleth… knowing which book Kant laid the groundwork for such later additions as IMP.

7: There is a story (pardon me for forgetting the exact citation) of some students asking a Zen master what happens when we die.  He replied that he did not know.  They got upset and asked how he could not know as he was a Zen master.  He simply informed them that was not yet a dead Zen master.  All people who cherish Eastern style authority should study this story well so that they will be less lost than us poor, skeptical, Westerners.

8: So true!  Seeing things us other mere mortals do not can be a result of your great sophistication and steadfast practice… or projection, delusion, fantasy, distortion, etc. please consult you local psychotherapist for a longer list… oh right that stuff only happens to me not you… so most folks can just skip this and the whole 3-2-1 Shadow process etc. due to their elite status.

9: See number 7.  Substitute “Zen master” with “Priest,” “Rabbi,” “Imam,” “Head of Scientology,” “Writer for Skeptic Magazine,” “Presidential candidate,” or other suitable title and reread.  Then ponder what that crazed fool Nietzsche meant when he said: “Belief means not wanting to know what is true.”  Examine all of the above from at least 10 altitudes and 5 differing perspectives.

10: Admittedly I do not keep up with the 'New Atheists' all that much, but I remember reading Sam Harris's book The End of Faith when it first came out and it seemed pretty reasonable to me.  It has been a while, but if I recall he even mentioned Wilber in a footnote or something.  I would guess that some Teal may avoid wading in because it is pretty obvious that Orange reason will not dislodge Blue values in people who are generally flying at Amber altitude (Teal has more important things to do with its precious time).  I would guess some Turquoise probably feel frustrated in wanting to be on both sides… many Turquoise individuals may believe in some form of Higher Power, but be deeply depressed with most of what goes on in the name of their Higher Power.  Also some Turquoise may see themselves as being beyond trying to change people. 

Just because materialism or reductionism taken to the extreme can sometimes be 'bad' does not mean we should jettison the methodology anymore than we should get rid of our toasters because they make terrible bath toys.”

Ha ha, that is good!

Great post Julian! Looks like the work of post-integral cognitive consciousness. hehehe

and I don't see any hostile commentators here, only good loving support

Hi Julian, I wrote a post on radical relativism - inspired by your post - here.

We probably see it in quite similar ways (or not, I don't know). I just have a hangup about the way some integral folks put it down :)

I may write more later on other aspects of your post.

Per

For me I notice #2 more than others and has been problematic for me from the beginning with some integral discussions.
#8 is also one that I see quite a bit in newbies to meditation practice along with #5.

I like this list.

Keeping it simple.

hey there all…..good to be back…..

julian i feel i've missed a mountain of posts, perhaps you can tell me which you think are most relevant in terms of catch-up…..

i like #3 above, and want to know more about #2. i have yet to understand states and stages….i think i have an inkling, but haven't read much about it…..

Hi Balder. I'm commenting here to part of something you wrote to me in this thread at Julian's blog. Julian asks that discussants bring the discussion from that thread to this one.

You wrote:

Yes, it is true that I do not think the materialist “metaphysic” is a satisfactory one. My point was that I have no intention of dismissing your arguments out of hand if they happen to be grounded in a perspective that strikes me as materialistic.  I understand that you might expect me to do so, based on your experience with other Integral students, but as you and I both value the imparative method of dialogue, I hope we can proceed with this discussion along those lines.  I am not saying I am immune from being dismissive or biased altogether, but typically that is unconscious on my part and is not a feature of my intentional approach to these sorts of inquiries.

I have a problem with the term “materialism” and I will explain why.

Within spiritual, transpersonal, and integral circles, the term “materialism” is a Janus-word, meaning that it is both descriptive and evaluative. I doubt that anyone could find a single instance in the entirety of Ken Wilber's voluminous work where he uses the term “materialism” without at least the implication of a negative connotation. I've been in and around spiritual and transpersonal circles since the early half of the 1970's on the West Coast, the East Coast, and in the Midwest, and I cannot recall a time when I've heard the term “materialist” used in such circles in anything but a way that has negative connotations.

Jim, it seems to me that we're in a sort of spiral of misunderstanding here.  I hope we can get out of it.  I understand the difference between physicalism and materialism, and I agree with you that it is important to clarify these terms for the sake of people who might be reading this discussion.  When I wrote, “I have no intention of dismissing your arguments out of hand if they happen to be grounded in a perspective that strikes me as materialist,” I wasn't saying this because your perspective really strikes me as necessarily flatland or naively materialistic; I was making this comment specifically because you had just said to me that you were afraid of being mischaracterized as such.

Also, did I ever suggest you were a “methodological materialist”?  If so, it was a typo; I believe I would have meant, “methodological naturalist,” since that is how you've described yourself previously.

Regarding the notion of the universe as “a vast field of information” – a view which may be consonant with pan-semiotics – neither you nor anyone else so far has responded to the Bohm essay on soma-significance that I've referenced and linked several times.  Do you have any thoughts on it?

Best wishes,

Balder

P.S. I have written a couple posts to you, I believe, since you last wrote to me.  I'm not sure if you've seen them all.  If you are going to respond to them, I'm not sure if it's more appropriate to respond to them here or on the other thread.  I imagine Julian is redirecting us here because he wants us to discuss the issues in his opening blog, rather than the 'philosophy of mind' discussion we have going on the other blog.

Julian,

Here is the beginning of a response to the many important issues you've raised.

1) Conflating of social worldviews with personal development. Conflating of being able to talk about social worldviews with having done the practice-work necessary to actually experience andunderstand certain personal stages.

I would describe this, in part, as the appropriation of various sophisticated translations in unsophisticated ways by individuals who have not done the “practice-work” on which those translations are founded.

2) Denial of pathology - “it's all stage appropriate” is the misguided mantra.

Do you have any examples that you can give of Integral folks denying pathology?  In my view, there certainly are things which are stage-appropriate, and we need to keep that in mind, but this does not undermine our ability to diagnose various pathological developments at any particular stage.  The counter mistakes are the pathologizing of whole stages of development, based on the criteria of a different vMeme or a higher stage, or the mistaking of levels for whole lines of development (the Level/Line Fallacy).

3) Omnipotent-utopian-“second-tier”- fantasy of being able to reconcile and transcend  all apparent opposties, most notably: true and false.

Calling this fantasy “non-dual”

I agree that folks often are tempted to engage in a facile “explaining away” or bypassing of issues or “opposites” in the name of a theoretical “nondualism.”

4) Rejection of rationality out of pre/trans fallacy based spirituality.

Again, I haven't come across very many Integral folks who reject rationality altogether.  I agree that there may be some pre/trans confusion going on within the Integral community, but “rejection of rationality” seems too strong to me.

5) Lack of practice/process methodology leading to meaningless use of language. Over abstracting with minimal actual application.

In a map- and theory-heavy field such as Integral, this is often a problem.  On the other hand, there may also be some distinctions which strike someone as impractical and “too abstract” because they haven't done the work yet to grasp in a fuller way what is being discussed.

6) “Myth of the Given” easily misunderstood as license to extreme relativism and even “you create your own reality.”

Likewise Post-metaphysics easily used in the service of nonsensical anti-rational arguments.

Certainly possible.  Can you give some examples?

7) A lingering hangover from Boomer exoticizing of the East.

Leads (amongst other things) to a faith-based subscription to the concept of “enlightenment,”  reincarnation etc.. as well as the idea that certain statements on the nature of reality, consciousness etc by Hindu “holy men” have some final truth even as we continue to evolve and integrate….

Yes, there is likely an over-idealization of the East going on.  However, from our discussions, I believe you may also not have a full grasp of some of the higher level Buddhist teachings, for example.  I may be wrong, but it appears to me that you see Western psychological knowledge (including the notion of archetypes, etc) and basic pyschological health (including facing and dealing with basic existential questions and issues) as the summit of psychospiritual realization, and if this is the case, I believe this is a problem in itself.

8) Use of  gross/subtle/causal as conceptual abstractions that then become containers for magic and mythic fantasies instead of signposts in a practice-based methodology.

Yes.  It's relatively easy to learn the translations and then misapply them.

9) Mis-using the level/line fallacy to suggest that the Amber faith can somehow be retained post-Orange and somehow be called “transrational.”

I think you have continually misunderstood this issue and are in fact committing a Level/Line fallacy here.  Amber faith, by definition, will not continue beyond Amber.  But folks like Fowler have argued that there are multiple forms and levels of “faith” – that the notion of faith is not, and should not be, limited to its particular Amber manifestation (which is, admittedly, the most common).  Similarly, not all forms of theism are confined to Amber-level understanding, though again the Amber level is most common.

Best wishes,

Balder

Hi Balder. I've seen all the posts you've written to me, and I am trying to respond to them in order. What I've written above is in response to the first paragraph of the oldest post you wrote to me that I have not yet responded to.

I have not yet read the Bohm piece. I have mentioned and linked to a number of articles that you have not commented on (e.g., Owen Flanagan's Templeton lectures), but I do not expect you or anyone to read everything I mention. I am currently reading several dense, difficult, fat books (and by “reading” I mean cover to cover, word for word, unlike when Ken says that he “reads” 3-4 books a day). I simply do not have time to read everything that looks interesting or that is recommended to me, and I doubt you do either. But I will look at the Bohm piece this week, and I will get back to you with my thoughts on it. (I'm assuming that the piece in question is the one I link to in the last sentence.)

I am glad to hear that my perspective does not strike you as “necessarily flatland or naively materialistic.” I hope my perspective doesn't strike you as flatland or naive at all.

I did wonder, though, because as I noted in a previous comment, you seemed to link the idea that consciousness emerged as a product of increasing biological complexity from non-conscious properties composed of non-conscious components with “materialism.”

Because I have said that I am inclined to think that consciousness (and how we define “consciousness” is of critical importance here) did emerge as stated, and because you associate acceptance of such emergence with materialism, it seems reasonable to me to assume that you must think my perspective is “materialistic.”

I have quoted Wilber saying two things in previous posts:

1) “…I do not push experience (or feelings or souls or any specific type of interior) all the way down…”

2) “Dennett, incidentally, sees a type of sentience emerging with amoebas. I am willing to settle for that…”

In response to my quoting Wilber saying the first statement at my blog, you said:

The qualification you highlighted is an important one: that, while we might find it defensible to say that “subjectivity” or interiority goes all the way down (and I do), we have to be careful about singling out any type of interiority as the thing that goes all the way down.

I agree with the first statement. As we continue to talk I will hopefully come to understand what you mean by “subjectivity” in this context with scare quotes about it. (It's not yet clear to me what the difference beween “subjectivity” with and without scare quotes is to you.)

I agree with the second statement as well, where Wilber uses the term “emerging” and indicates that he is willing to accept something that Daniel Dennett accepts. If you can go along with Wilber on that, then that's another place where we are at least in general agreement regarding emergence.

If you think it's appropriate, I'll respond to your posts to me at the other thread, at the other thread.

All best,

Jim

I am having difficulty getting my post to show up - it keeps getting chopped off.  Not sure if it is the Firefox I am using or the cut and paste.  Anway a much briefer version follows - I wanted to include some passages from Wilber's papers but alas.

James asked Jim:

Also, from your reading of Wilber, do you think he does appeal to these mystical states as reliable sources of propositional knowledge?

Jim,

I'll hold off responding to you in detail now, since I already have several posts to you out there flapping in the cyberwind and I don't want to keep adding more.  But I'll respond briefly to your request that I clarify my use of scare quotes around the word, subjectivity. 

I use them mainly because I'm aware of a number of models that have been proposed for resolving the hard problem, not all of which would accept the term, subjectivity, as the best term for describing that element of consciousness/sentience that is considered irreducible.  Some theorists would argue that other terms are better, such as phenomenal information (Chalmers), meaning (Bohm), sense (Hut – where sense is akin to meaning, not sensation), and so on.

Shawn,

Thank you for that – it's helpful.  That is also my understanding of Wilber's current position on the subject.

Best wishes,

Balder

Hi Julian,

I'm wondering about this statement: Conflating of being able to talk about social worldviews with having done the practice-work necessary to actually experience and understand certain personal stages.

Does this mean that only people who have achieved a certain “stage” of development are entitled, or “qualified,” to talk meaningfully about that “stage”?

This is a continuation from the other blog.

There, Shawn gives a reference in which Wilber states that satori “solves” the hard problem of consciousness. Jim gives the following reference: “In Eye to Eye, first published in 1983, Wilber says that “transcendental methodology constitutes an experimental, verifiable, repeatable proof for the existence of Godhead, as a fact…” (italics in orginal).”

No doubt, various traditions have claimed a special mode of knowing particular to their tradition, a kind of “metaphysical intuition” (yogi-pratyaksha; sakshatkara; anubhava; nirvikalpa-jnana; prajna; bodhi; viveka-khyati, etc.) that “transcends” the “worldly” ways of knowing. In such traditions, this metaphysical intuition is supposed to provide a form of soteriological “veracity;” almost always it is presented as a kind of “self-evident” truth. In Advaita it is the “intuition” that consciousness, which constitutes the eternal essential self, transcends the impermanent mind and body.

While interesting on their own, from an impartial philosophical point of view, I find appeals to “transcendental methodologies” to be problematic. I find them problematic because there is no uniformity as to what these various metaphysical intuitions are intuiting. In this sense, metaphysical intuition is not at all like the “experimental, verifiable, repeatable” proof that we find in the empirical sciences.
Contrary to the claims of Wilber and others it is simply not the case that these intuitions are intuiting the same thing. As Jim notes:

“But if something can only be tested through meditative or contemplative methods, then, as you point out and has many people have been pointing out for years, there is the little matter of interpretation. In the book The Bodhgaya Interviews, the Dalai Lama says: “Liberation in which 'a mind that understands the sphere of reality annihilates all defilements in the sphere of reality' is a state that only Buddhists can accomplish. This kind of moksa or Nirvana is only explained in the Buddhist scriptures, and is achieved only through Buddhist practice.Questioner: “So, if one is a follower of Vedanta, and one reaches the state of satcitananda, would this not be considered ultimate liberation?” His Holiness: “Again, it depends upon how you interpret the words, 'ultimate liberation.'”.”

To give another example, while the Buddhists and Vedantins both acknowledge nirvikalpa-pratyaksha, they simply do not agree, as their Naiyayika detractors point out, as to what it is that this nirvikalpa-pratyaksha is apprehending. And it is certainly not the case, as Wilber contends, that for tradition in general, there is a metaphysical intution of “consciousness as eternal.” Such a claim unfairly prejudices a Vedantic teaching. 

What I think is going on is this: these “metaphysical intuitions” are particular to particular traditions. Each tradition has its own mode of “intuition” – a form of intellectual insight, really, a kind of “seeing” (darshana), or understanding – and each tradition has its own “reality” corresponding to this “mode.” The practice of meditation, as I see it, is concerned with developing this “seeing,” something that no doubt takes years of practice.

In this regard, while it is true to say as Julian does that one can make a distinction between: 1) the spiritual experience itself; 2) how the experience is interpreted, at the same time, it also appears to be the case, given that the traditions do NOT agree, that “experience” – and by this I mean the particular kinds of “seeing” attached to particular traditions – is, always already, shot through with “interpretation.” Reality, here, is not “given;” it is seen through the lense of each traditional teaching – as “empty,” as “the nature of consciousness,” as “God's play,” etc.

Kela,

These are interesting, important points.  I am feeling an itch to start a new blog on some of them.  I think what is important to note here is that where perennialism tends to subscribe to the myth of the given – and while, to the extent that Wilber imports some brand of empiricism into mystical studies and the determination of universal mystical truths, he may smuggle it in also – there is a contrary problem with contextualism:  the Myth of the Framework.  Both perennialism and contextualism presuppose a sort of Cartesian-Kantian dualism – a split between Interpretation and Reality.  (You can possibly see this dualism in Julian's opening blog post).  The “way forward,” in my view, out of the thicket of both perennialism and contextualism has begun to be charted by a few individuals.  I believe TSK moves in this direction, such as with its notion of “readouts.”  And transpersonalist Jorge Ferrer does too, I believe, with his “participatory vision.”

Do you think this topic deserves a thread of its own, or would you like to carry forward with it here?  (I'm asking Julian and others as well as you.)

Best wishes,

Balder

Julian: “this grab-bag of half understood integral theory, new age spirituality, and relativism has now erroneously become synonymous with “turquoise” on zaadz - and i am saying that in the absence of a practice methodology that serves as the experiential counterpart to the map people are reading about, much of he theory - especially that of stages becomes meaningless.”

There is definitely something to what you are saying here, Julian. This is what pluralists do: they figure out what is the “best” and call whatever they are doing that. So suddenly Green politics are “integral” and self-indulgence is “spiritual.”

One helpful distinction is between “cognition” and “self-sense.” Cognition always comes first–a person may be able to think integral, at first usually just when they are reading it or when others are talking about it. But they will still be pluralistic emotionally, still have a Green self-sense, which takes longer to transform. This really becomes apparent when emotional issues are discussed, like politics. Someone integral like Tony Blair is “conservative,” and someone pluralistic like Dennis Kucinich is “integral.” But part of it is just not understanding well what integral politics looks like.

However, there will be certain things that look and sound New Age or mythic or even magic but are really Turquoise or higher, like the three faces of God idea.

Self-assessment tools sound like a great idea. There are tests at Suzanne-Cook Greuter's website, but they are not cheap ($300-400).

David

Hi Everyone

Jim
Thanks very much for the detailed response, and for the references to the Cambridge Handbook article on neuroscience and consciousness which I really liked.

You say to Bruce that you are inclined to think that “consciousness emerged as a product of increasing biological complexity from non-conscious properties composed of non-conscious components”. Me too.  (So for me the bigger question is a biological / molecular one and is probably even “harder” than “the hard problem” - it's not “how did / does consciousness emerge” but “how did animate life emerge from inanimate material”! But that's another story….)

I would like to look further into an issue previously mentioned (by Balder or Jim…? I can't now find the original reference… sorry) regarding the importance of the  “architecture” of this increasing complexity. I think the example was given that a table has a complex collection of materials, parts, molecule atoms, particles… but it has no consciousness, whereas any mammal, because of the biological nature of it's architecture and it's far greater degree of complexity, is more able to “conduct”  or “hold”  various degrees of consciousness - can anyone point me to the original comment about this, or even better in the direction of  further  reading material on this particular point? Thanks in advance…

Jim, I'm also reading through Barbara Montero's article The Body Problem - thanks again for providing great links.



Bruce
Following on from kelamuni's important distinctions re. contextualism and perennialsim (as you then succinctly paraphrased it), you then refer to the diamond approach and also Jorge Ferrer's work. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on what Wilber said regarding Ferrer circa 2001- 2002:
“Jorge is one of the nicest, dearest souls you could ever meet. He's truly an amazing person. But I do believe that the view he is representing is basically a green-meme view of psychology and spirituality. I realize that that is exactly the issue being contested: can we really 'rank' views like that? And I realize that sensitive men and women can reasonably disagree on this delicate, difficult issue. At this point, in my opinion, it is simply a matter of personal inclination: if you resonate with green-meme values, you will resonate with Ferrer; if you resonate with second-tier values, you will not. At this point, no amount of argument, evidence, facts, or rhetoric will make you change your mind, which is fine. But I do believe that Ferrer's book basically marks the end of the transpersonal movement; with relativistic pluralism, no matter how dialectically presented, there is simply nowhere to go. Postmodernism is dying a slow and fitful death; increasingly scholars are moving from pluralism to integralism, in my opinion. The insuperable difficulties of Ferrer's book are a condensation of three decades of postmodern wrong turns, or so it seems to me.”

I'm yet to read the Bohm article you linked us to but always grateful for the references you're providing us with here.

Also, I'd really like to hear your thoughts, here or on a new thread, with regards to “the way out of the thicket re perennialism and contextualism”. Are these really shot through with a Cartesian - Kantian dualism between interpretation and reality? It sees to me that the quotes from the Dalai Lama suggest he's not that aware of his own interpretation on what he calls reality, so he's not insisting on the duality between the two…. or am I missing something?


Shawn
Thanks for the Wilber quotes - I'm going to try to find those entire articles. Even though as Jim pointed out there is the issue of interpretation, I'm finding the range of Wilber's scope captured in these quotes here pretty appealing. Is he not anticipating, or has he anticipated elsewhere, the problem of interpretation?

My only issue is that he seems to be saying the only quadrant that has acccess to the non-dual is the interior subjective one - via satori - and what's more, the satori experiences count as empirical answers to the hard problem… And the works of Whitehead et al are somewhat “relegated” to the relative plane


Kelamuni
Appreciating your areas of experise and the clear distinctions you are making - thanks.


Julian
I also had grey squares blocking out my screen and they are still there for me over at your old blog.


Loving the discussion, James

Hi James. Whatever you read re the importance of the “architecture” of increasing complexity is not something I think I wrote.

I would say that anyone who wants to get an overview of various positions on the “mind-body problem” might start with a textbook on the subject, such as the revised edition of Philosophy of Mind by Jaegwon Kim.

Kim writes in a 2003 paper, “During the past several decades, nonreductive physicalism has been the dominant orthodoxy on the mind-body problem.”

Hi, James,

I just got Ferrer's book at the library yesterday, which is why I was referencing him.  I have only begun dipping into a few sections of the book so far, and I may have misunderstood where he is going.  From what I've read (in chapter 6, mostly), it seemed to me that he was suggesting a way forward that neither followed the myth of the given, nor succumbed to arbitrary relativism or subjectivism.  But perhaps I am wrong about what he is doing.  From what I read, it seemed to me that he is suggesting a similar vision to Wilber's “enacted worldspaces,” which is what I explored in my recent blog – where the enacted worldspaces are, indeed, partially constructed, but not arbitrary, not reducible to the terms of Idealism, and certainly not subject to naive Secret-like manipulation. 

Let me read more of the book, and I'll get back to you.  He may be advocating a Green postmodern view, after all. 

Just as a side note, a concern of mine is the consequence that follows from certain of our (post)modern epistemological commitments – a condition of “estrangement from reality” or alienation of human beings from “the world.”  For instance, in pointing out that the “ultimate realities” of different spiritual traditions are not simply given, but shot through with interpretation, are we led inevitably towards (mere) subjectivism or intersubjectivism … where the mind becomes a prisoner of its own arbitrary or culturally constructed hall of mirrors, having nothing to do with “empirical fact” or “the real world”?  

I believe Wilber's model, especially in its latest form (Integral Postmetaphysics), represents a viable way out of the “thicket of (premodern) perennialism and (postmodern) contextualism” – or at least a valiant attempt.  Kela is pointing out a potential problem with reliance on transcendental methodologies to arrive at empirical facts about ultimate reality, which is something Wilber does appear to do when he appeals to satori as the answer to the “hard problem.”  From the little I've read of Ferrer, he appears to make the same challenge to Wilber's reliance on contemplative knowledge  – acknowledging that there are, in fact, transconceptual disclosures available in contemplation, but challenging the notion that transconceptual knowledge leads to a single insight.  He argues for a multiplicity of transconceptual disclosures.  This is why I mentioned him in relation to Kela's comments….

Anyway, there's a lot to explore here.  It does relate to Julian's topic, so I'm up for continuing here, but I would also be happy to take it up on another blog.

Best wishes,

Balder

P.S.  P.S.  I just skimmed a review of Ferrer's book on the Shambhala site.  The author says that Ferrer's model is “complete” on the quadrant side of things, but leaves out levels and lines and relies too much on the “enactive” component.  That may be – and if so, his overall model wouldn't be integral (from an AQAL standard).  But Wilber also acknowledges that he has important points to make, so I'm not going to apologize for bringing him up!

P.P.S.  Jim, I just saw your recent post to James.  I'm the one who talked about “architecture.”  I also mentioned to you, on the other thread, that Wilber's model (which places “matter” on the outside of all “occasions” rather than as the bottom rung of the chain of being) is therefore amenable to a physicalist description at all levels of the cosmos.  It sounds like we agree…

Julian,

I wrote:  On the other hand, there may also be some distinctions which strike someone as impractical and “too abstract” because they haven't done the work yet to grasp in a fuller way what is being discussed.

You replied: define “doing the work” in this context and give me an example please.

“Doing the work” could be something as simple as just taking the time to study something; to actually spending time in deep inquiry over it, wresting with it and applying it; to engaging in practices or learning disciplines which support it.  As a teacher, I'm sure you've run into instances of students who tell you that something you're describing is very vague and abstract, when you know the problem really is not that the ideas are especially “vague” or abstract,” but rather that the material is new enough to these students that they haven't really grasped the ways that it relates to (and impacts) the different dimensions of their life and thought and practice.  An example of doing actual practice that grounds an abstract-seeming concept is the Buddhist tradition of inquiring into and meditating on emptiness, which involves rigorous work (intellectually and contemplatively) and leads to insights which can have immediate and profound impacts.  There is a difference between learning ways to “use” emptiness in a sentence – the language of spirituality – and doing this work.  From the former perspective, “emptiness” will likely strike someone as an abstract, perhaps even arcane philosophical artifact rather than something which has living significance.  A more conventional example would be something like mathematics - where, to non-mathematicians, the ideas may seem particularly vague and ungrounded; but to those who work with them regularly, they can “see” these things, these relationships and patterns, in the world around them in vivid (according to some, visceral) ways.

Best wishes,

B.

Here is a re-working of some of the ideas presented above:

“Satori solves the hard problem of consciousness.” What does this mean?

Does it mean that with “bodhi” there is the recognition, as per the usual Buddhist teaching, that consciousness (vijnana) is merely one of the impermanent “heaps” (skandhas)? Somehow I doubt that this is what is meant. No, what I think is meant is that with “satori” there comes a realization 1. that consciousness is irreducible to, and in fact transcends, the body-mind complex; and 2. that consciousness is the eternal (nitya) unchanging (kutastha) witness (sakshin) underlying, and presupposed by, changing states of mind (citta-vritti). In other words, “satori” here means realizing the “truth” of teachings such as Advaita Vedanta, Patanjala Yoga, and Samkhya. And this “realization” is supposed to “solve” the problem of consciousness for the one who has achieved it.

What is the nature of this “realization?” Tradition speaks of it as a “determinate cognition” or “personal conviction” (nischaya) that comes with the fruition of the practice of examination/inspection (pariksha) of the nature of mind and consciousness. What then is the status of this “personal conviction?” Well, for one, as a personal conviction, it can hardly be said to fulfil the role of an philosophical account of the nature of consciousness. Personal convictions are subjective states, which, while meaningful for the one who has been convinced, do little to assuage the enquiring minds of other philosophers. Such “realizations” are qualitatively no different from the conviction of the born-again Christian who maintains that he has awakened to the “truth” that he has an immortal soul that has been saved. As such, personal convictions are functionally indistinguishable from articles of faith.

But should we not then “take up the injunction” and find out for ourselves the “truth” of these teachings? On the face of it, this looks promising, until we realize that the “inspection” carried out by traditions like Advaita is really an examination carried out with its eye on a pre-determined result. This is because the aims of such inquiries are soteriological. In other words, they aim at moksha, and in the context of Vedanta/Yoga this means realizing the eternality of the self; no eternality, no moksha. That their result is pre-determined can be seen in the fact that different injunctions, different forms of inspection, will produce different results. A typically Buddhist form of inspection, for example, will produce an entirely opposite result: the “realization” that consciousness (vijnana) is not permanent and unchanging, but an ever-changing flux of cognitive moments (kshana) coming and going. Thus, the metaphysics found in traditions like Vedanta are good examples of what has been called “wish list” metaphysics: metaphysical inquiries that set out to save whatever is held dear from the outset. They are not impartial explorations of ontology, and as such, they will not be seen in a favorable light by many philosophers.

Hi Balder,
I suppose we could spin off on the points you raise and start a new thread, though that's a tough subject you breach. If you'd like to bring up the issues you raise at your own blog I'll try to bring what I can to the discussion there. Here, I was attempting to follow through on some ideas as they relate to Wilber and the ongoing discussion concerning the philosophy of mind (which itself seemed to spin off from the discussion concerning theism) and found myself in territory that we had already discussed elsewhere. Interesting how these issued are interrelated. 
cheers,
kela

Jim, I've never been comfortable with the Star Trek transporter–although you probably could've guess that! ;-) The main problem is that I see a complex of “bodies” subtler than the physical–such as the etheric/pranic and the astral/emotional-mental–and I'm not sure if they would “translate.”

This applies to, say, processed vs. un-processed food: The less processed, the more “life-force” (etheric-pranic) the food retains. Or perhaps a “pranic explanation” for jet lag: the subtler bodies get out of alignment with the physical during flight.

No mental difference without a physical difference.

If we play with the definition of “physical,” I'm game. Or rather, if we equate “mental” with “interior” and “physical” with “exterior, so that we can say:

For every interior there is an exterior, and vice versa.

But these forms may be unrecognizable to our current understanding. For example, if something exists after death it doesn't necessarily need a physical flesh-and-blood body to exist; a subtle one would suffice to satisfy the above formula, where “physical” (or exterior) means a “body” of some kind–whether of matter, energy, or whatever. Something that is (potentially) perceptible.

To put it another way, if consciousness requires form to exist, I don't think the death of the physical form “proves” the death of consciousness–only that it if it does continue, it “inhabits” (or manifests as) a subtle form.

Jim and Bruce

Thnaks very much for the detailed responses. Lots to chew over here.

All The Best,

James

Kela said: While interesting on their own, from an impartial philosophical point of view, I find appeals to “transcendental methodologies” to be problematic. I find them problematic because there is no uniformity as to what these various metaphysical intuitions are intuiting. In this sense, metaphysical intuition is not at all like the “experimental, verifiable, repeatable” proof that we find in the empirical sciences.  Contrary to the claims of Wilber and others it is simply not the case that these intuitions are intuiting the same thing.

Balder said: Kela is pointing out a potential problem with reliance on transcendental methodologies to arrive at empirical facts about ultimate reality, which is something Wilber does appear to do when he appeals to satori as the answer to the “hard problem.”  From the little I've read of Ferrer, he appears to make the same challenge to Wilber's reliance on contemplative knowledge  - acknowledging that there are, in fact, transconceptual disclosures available in contemplation, but challenging the notion that transconceptual knowledge leads to a single insight.  He argues for a multiplicity of transconceptual disclosures. 

I say: Try reading Michel Bauwens' latest essay at Integral World, “The Next Buddha is a Community.” He references both Ferrer and Heron in that essay. he makes some mportant points (for me): 1) That this so-called meditative/contemplative line is only one line of several in so-called “spirituality”; 2) that this line gets unnecessary and undue influence in the overall formula of spirituality, 3) there are not only more important lines involved but that it is their integration that matters; 4) that this entire process is now contingent of a post-traditional, collaborative inquiry and no longer within the narrow confines of traditions that sefl-define such states of experience (as kela points out).

I would add that even the entire notion of “spirituality” is challenged in postmodernity, as such states of experience, which occur to us all, are alreadys already contextualized and that perhaps our pomo contextualizations are more accurate than previous, “spiritual” interpretations. That is, if we think we are “evolving” in our worldviews. As to whether Wilber's version of integrating the pre, modern and pomo worldviews goes beyond such pomo insights as Derrida and Deleuze is questionable.

Hi Jonny, you say:

if consciousness requires form to exist, I don't think the death of the physical form “proves” the death of consciousness–only that it if it does continue, it “inhab